Docker: Life Before and After
Containers have been around for over a decade. But prior to Docker’s explosive success which began in 2013, they were not well-known at all. Long gone are the days of chroot, containers are all the rage now, and with them comes a whole new set of development and security challenges.
Prehistoric times – chroot and jails
Chroot was first introduced over 40 years ago in 1979 during the development of Unix V7. It was created to change the parent root filesystem of a process and its children, nothing more. There were no network namespaces, no modern process isolation. In 2000, FreeBSD jails extended upon chroot and introduced additional sandboxing features. Jails have their own network interfaces with their own IP addresses, disallowing raw sockets by default. These started to resemble virtual machines.
The Linux community shortly followed suit with Linux-VServer in 2001 and OpenVZ in 2005. Both were out-of-tree patches to the Linux kernel, and thus relatively complex to maintain. They provided decent network and process isolation but weren’t without their shortcomings. It didn’t help that hosting providers sold these containers as light-weight virtual machines, frustrating users who wanted the same capabilities they had with VMs.
Middle Ages – cgroups, namespaces and LXC
Control groups (cgroups) are a Linux kernel feature introduced in 2008 to isolate the resource usage (CPU, memory, disk, network, etc) of groups of processes. It underwent many changes over the years but always kept its main purpose, which is to provide a unified interface for process isolation in the Linux kernel. Cgroups were redesigned in 2013, along with a new feature called Linux namespaces. Namespaces partition kernel resources so that a process in one namespace cannot see resources of other namespaces. Making almost all parts of the Linux kernel namespace-aware is still an ongoing project. The most important ones are mount, process ID, network, interprocess communication, and user namespace. Cgroups and namespaces changed everything, as they are the building blocks of all modern container technologies on Linux.
Also in 2008, LXC was born built on cgroups and namespaces. It was the first accessible container tool that worked with the upstream Linux kernel. However, the early versions were less secure than its prehistoric relatives, Linux-VServer and OpenVZ. Root in an LXC container meant root on the host. This was no longer the case with LXC 1.0 which took an important step in container security by introducing unprivileged containers with the help of user namespaces.
CloudFoundry entered the game with Warden in 2011 using LXC under the hood. It had separate server and client components, intended to manage containers across a cluster of machines. They later replaced LXC with their own platform-agnostic implementation. Warden containers usually only had two layers: a read-only OS root filesystem and a runtime filesystem from building blocks called buildpacks. CloudFoundry is still around but they’ve abandoned Warden in favor of modern standards.
Google, already playing a leading role in the container world, and whose engineers invented cgroups, also introduced their open-source tool in 2013 called Let Me Contain That For You. LMCTFY never got off the ground as development halted when they started contributing to new standard components in 2015 and introduced nsjail. More on those later.
Systemd too has an answer to containers: systemd-nspawn. Implied by its name, it manages Linux namespaces, and systemd itself can be used to restrict resource usage with cgroups. It is a decent alternative to LXC and obviously integrates well within the systemd ecosystem.
What these early container tools lack are container images. You have to create the root filesystem for chroot or bind mount parts of the host system in read-only mode. Of course, you could just extract an archive containing the entire rootfs, or create a filesystem snapshot, but most people aren’t distribution and automation experts. Furthermore, simple archives have no concept of additional container metadata.
Mainstream Popularity – Docker
Enter Docker, invented by dotCloud, Inc. in 2013. Right from the start, Docker created docker images and the Dockerfile. They also made a registry to host images, taking care of the distribution part. Anybody could create a docker image that anybody else could run on their machine with a simple command. It all quickly lead to mainstream success. But it was not without cost, with decades of best practices flying out the window.
That may sound somewhat harsh, but many wheels had to be reinvented since everything was now bundled together in images. There is no way to update vulnerable dependencies without rebuilding every affected image. You might not even be able to rebuild an image if it isn’t reproducible – which usually isn’t a requirement. Hashes of image layers were not deterministic. There was no way to cryptographically sign images for a long time. Build dependencies and artifacts were left in image layers resulting in bloat. There were no guidelines on how to manage secrets. Many people treated Docker as an alternative to virtual machines… People running images built by random people from the internet without any kind of verification.
Container security was a nightmare. But since then, several tools have been created to scan images for vulnerabilities, and there are now multiple ways to sign images. Image layers are deterministic. There are multi-stage builds and layer squashing. There are a lot of popular well-maintained official images and alternative registries to Docker Hub. Slowly, new best-practices emerged.
In the early days, Docker was also built on LXC which they’ve abandoned for their in-house container library. Until they’ve implemented user namespaces, running processes as root in docker containers was similarly dangerous. There is a multitude of security features to further lock down containers. Docker now supports a generous number of backing filesystems from overlayfs through devicemapper to BTRFS. (we won’t mention the terrors of aufs and the early days of overlayfs.) Docker also has separate client and server components which is a considerable attack vector. Anybody who has access to the docker daemon can gain root on the host.
They started adding complementary features such as Swarm mode to manage a cluster of docker daemons, secret management, and more. This went against the Unix philosophy of building interoperable parts that did one thing well. Docker, Inc. took some controversial steps trying to monetize their business. For example, dropping long-term support for community releases. Alternatives started to emerge and suddenly there was a need for standards.
Docker also has a desktop application for Mac OS which utilizes a light-weight Linux VM and this brings some challenges of its own.. Docker on Windows is similar, except it supports native Windows containers and also works in Windows Subsystem for Linux – courtesy of Microsoft. So by now it really is “build anywhere, run anywhere”.
Alternatives – rkt
CoreOS – recently acquired by RedHat – announced rkt in late 2014 as a response to Docker, focusing on standards and compatibility. Rkt integrates tightly with systemd which Docker was pushing back against at the time. It implemented pods – groups of containers sharing [some] namespaces. It had pluggable execution stages, so you could use systemd-nspawn, simple chroot, or even light-weight virtual machines with KVM or Xen. Of course, all compatible with plain old docker images. Eventually, standards and common libraries were created and rkt started fading away. It achieved its original purpose.
Open Foundations – The Beginning of Standardization
In mid-2015, the Open Container Initiative was born under the Linux Foundation’s umbrella, founded by Docker, CoreOS, and other leaders in the container industry. OCI is a governance structure for creating open industry standards around container formats and runtime. It hosts important projects such as runC which is a CLI tool – donated by Docker – to run containers according to the OCI specification. RunC is widely used in modern container stacks.
An older, equally important project for containers is the Cloud Native Computing Foundation, also a part of the Linux Foundation. CNCF hosts a plethora of open-source container-related projects such as Kubernetes, Prometheus, containerd, CNI, CRI-O, and many more.
Containerd is a daemon for Linux and Windows that manages the complete container lifecycle of its host. It supports the OCI image and runtime specifications via runC. Many projects use it internally such as Docker or Kubernetes.
Container Network Interface provides specifications and libraries for configuring network interfaces in Linux containers from simple bridges to custom overlay networks. CNI is also a key part of modern container stacks.
Orchestration Wars – Kubernetes
Back in 2014 when standards in the container industry still seemed like a pipe dream, another important project came to light. Kubernetes was launched by engineers at Google, heavily influenced by experience with Google’s internal container orchestration systems. It quickly attracted contributors from key players in the industry such as RedHat, CoreOS, and Intel. Kubernetes is a complex system for automating deployment, management, and scaling of containers. It was adopted by the CNCF, along with most of its key components. Kubernetes first used Docker as its container runtime. But now it supports any runtime via the Container Runtime Interface, such as CRI-O which implements this interface via containerd and runC.
Docker’s slice of the orchestration pie was Swarm which has been a standalone tool for managing a cluster of docker daemons via the same API. It was superseded by Swarm mode which is included in Docker since version 1.12. Kubernetes’ ever-growing popularity and faster development cycle overshadowed Swarm. Here at Avatao we have both Swarm and mostly Kubernetes for different purposes.
Also worth mentioning is Marathon, a container orchestration system for Apache Mesos and DC/OS which is a distributed cloud operating-system based on the Mesos distributed systems kernel. But that’s a topic for another time.
Alternatives – Podman
With all these open standards it is now relatively easy to build compatible container stacks. Podman is a CLI tool started by RedHat, built on industry standards. It is mostly CLI compatible with Docker but it works without a daemon with user namespaces. That means every user on the host system has their own context with their own uid mapping. Podman does not support docker-compose because they believe Kubernetes is the defacto standard for pods and as such it supports launching pods from Kubernetes manifests for local development. Despite this, there is a podman-compose project. Podman is strictly meant to be a CLI tool, for a daemon-based setup, there is containerd, for Kubernetes there is CRI-O.
Some of the related tools from RedHat are skopeo and buildah. Skopeo is a tool for managing OCI and original docker images and registries. It supports copying from various storage backends, inspecting images locally or from registries, deleting images, and so on. Buildah is a tool with the sole purpose of building OCI and docker images in a more traditional way.
Nsjail – For All of Us Hackers
Nsjail isn’t exactly an alternative to docker. Rather, it is a light-weight process isolation tool that also happens to be utilizing namespaces, cgroups and seccomp. Nsjail is not for running images, it is for manually configuring chroot, namespaces, cgroups and seccomp like Frankenstein. The target audience is security researchers and developers – it’s not for the faint of heart.
For instance, some emulators do not like being confined to containers… They even have interactive setups for accepting licenses and refuse to run multiple instances. They usually require gigabytes of data. Creating a docker image would be a lot of effort. So let’s configure the emulator on the host then run it with nsjail. In inetd mode to create instances on demand, in an isolated network namespace, and with overlayfs on top of the bind-mounted data directory. Now, for every incoming connection to a port, we get an emulator instance in a container which is none the wiser. Changes to the filesystem are only made on the overlay filesystem. If this sounds like if it was for a Capture the Flag competition, it’s because it was.
Back to the Future – Light-weight Virtual Machines
As container tools matured so did virtual machines. The benefit of containers over VMs is that they’re light-weight thus much more easily scalable, starting in milliseconds instead of minutes. But VMs aren’t necessarily the slow-moving behemoths they used be. This revolution started with the Clear Containers project by Intel. Essentially, there is no need for BIOS or UEFI, it jumps directly into the Linux kernel which can be booted in less than a second without complex hardware drivers. Imagine combining the simplicity of container images with the robustness and security of hardware-assisted VMs. This inspired various projects such as Kata Containers, an active project growing in popularity or Amazon’s Firecracker microVMs.
Containerized Desktop Applications
I and a couple of like-minded scientists started experimenting with containerizing desktop applications some years ago. Particularly proprietary applications that only supported a specific distribution, such as Skype for work. Check out @jessfraz. Basically, you bind mount everything the application needs from the host: the X11 socket, the Wayland socket, the PulseAudio socket, you have to have the same user ID and credentials in the container. You see where this is going. I’ve given up on it as it took constant effort to maintain.
Some time passes and Flatpak was introduced, a container-based technology for building and distributing desktop applications on Linux. Flatpak actually has a long history going back before Docker even existed but it only took its current name in 2016, and then was endorsed by RedHat and others. Containers are only secondary in Flatpak’s story. Desktop environments and frameworks needed to catch up for them to be seamlessly integrated with sandboxed applications. Flatpak does everything we used to have to do manually. It also implemented portals for file choosers, printing, notifications, etc. There are also community-maintained repositories (remotes), most importantly, Flathub.
However, just because an app runs with Flatpak, it doesn’t mean it’s completely locked down and secure. If you’re still using X11, it is exposed to attacks, there is no way around this. An application might specify that it needs access to your entire home directory, although that is generally avoided and can be overridden.
Also check out Fedora Silverblue, a desktop distribution based on containers where the host system is immutable, backed by OSTree. Everything runs in containers, be it a desktop application with Flatpak, a system service with runC, or a regular docker container. This is all fascinating but still tiresome for a developer who often needs to tinker with their system.
As you can see, more has happened in the last 5-6 years since Docker’s introduction than in the 30 years from chroot to cgroups and namespaces. The industry is still trying to catch up to containers and orchestration systems. But containers are no longer the latest technological stepping stone. Serverless is the next big thing that abstracts away everything this post was about and focuses on the application instead. You no longer need to worry about container security. Because in the end, all that matters is the application. Serverless reminds me of the ancient days of enterprise Java where you would just write what you want and it happened – or not. It’s an endless cycle.
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